Tag Archives: kickback

Remunerating Doctors to Buy Blood Clot Treating Devices: Illegal?

27 Oct

On September 22, 2026, U.S. District Judge Gregory H. Woods dismissed a class-action securities fraud case: Michiana Area Electrical Workers’ Pension Fund v. Inari Medical Inc., et al. (2026). The investors had failed to prove with sufficient specificity that the company had engaged in an illegal doctor-kickback scheme or deliberately misled shareholders to inflate its stock price.

The evidence confirmed that Inari was providing up to $50,000 in corporate dinners, junkets a vacation destinations and NASCAR race tickets in exchange for doctors ordering Inari’s products. But such spending was found to be standard in this industry (according to the AdvaMed Code of Ethics on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals), as opposed to amounting to illegal kickbacks. The filers attempted to argue AdvaMed does specify a “per individual limit of $3,000 for gifts and promotional materials.” While one salesperson spent $50,000 on physician dinners over a three-month period, and another $5,000, each physician was not receiving over $3,000.

Inari is a manufacturer of technologies that treat and remove blood clots. The case was filed against Inari’s three former administrators: CEO, COO and CFO. They had operated a successful doctor-buttering scheme between 2021-4, before, on February 28, 2024, revealing to investors that they had received a civil investigative demand from the Department of Justice (DOJ), which was investigating if Inari’s practices were violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act. This revelation led to a single-day 21% drop in Inari’s stock price, at a loss of $700 million in market capitalization.

Since this meant three invested pension funds had lost a lot of money, in May to June 2024, they filed a joint complaint over securities fraud and racketeering. One of the pension funds’ objections was that the administrators had collected $155.5 million in profits during the three years when the DOJ probe was active, but was not publicly disclosed by Inari.

The pension funds lost partly because DOJ’s probe failed to uncover evidence the gifts to physicians were illegal, and this meant the civil lawsuit lacked evidence underlying crimes had occurred. The administrators were allowed to delay disclosure until the date when they revealed it: they did not break the law by their delay. And they were acting in the best interests of shareholders by not disclosing earlier, since the stock would have plummeted earlier, and too soon before the DOJ had to report they had not found any prosecutable law-breaking. The filers might have assumed DOJ records would have what apparently failed to surface in discovery: they had no specific names of a doctor, date, or venue where a provably illegal transaction had taken place. All records proved was that Inari had spent a lot of money on sales and marketing.

The funds might have attached erroneous assumptions by the finding in the Purdue Pharma fraud case. It seems on the surface that Inari spending 68% of its revenue on sales and administration to cultivate customers was as illegal as what Purdue was doing. But in Purdue, the feds were able to prove systemic quid pro quo financial bribery in paying fraudulent “speaker fees” and consulting retainers well over the $3,000 limit to serve as pushers of prescriptions that they were fraudulently selling as safe when they were deadly addictive. There was nothing proven to be fraudulent with Inari’s core devices. Most small businesses wish it was illegal for giant corporations to spend such enormous sums on convincing people to buy their products. But his is how capitalism works: not the best products but the most effective sales campaigns win market share. The legality of Inari’s actions should have been apparent through brisk disclosures without a years-long DOJ audit. If DOJ had dropped their case upon failing to find wrongdoing, investors would not have lost millions in a panic sell-off. The public is too trusting in government actions: when the government declares it is auditing somebody, the public assumes the entity is guilty before the test results come in.

Suggested Citation:
Faktorovich, Anna. “Remunerating Doctors to Buy Blood Clot Treating Devices: Illegal?” Anaphora’s Law Review (October 27, 2026).

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Drug Dealer Informant and His Corrupt HSI Handler Caught in $280,000 Cocaine Sale by DEA’s Informant

24 Oct

On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Northern District of Illinois affirmed the conviction in United States v. Gary L. Howard of Howard to a 13-year prison sentence. Howard was appealing that the drug deal he was caught making was part of the work he previously did as a confidential informant for Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Howard has been convicted on three federal drug charges for selling cocaine in a 2018 sting when he attempted purchasing 10 kilograms of cocaine for $280,000 in the parking lot of informant seller “Z’s” furniture store. A search of his home uncovered a loaded firearm and a drug ledger.

Howard’s HSI handler Anthony Sabaini had been receiving tips from Howard on rival dealers. In exchange for information, Sabaini had been asking other agencies to “stand down” on investigating Howard’s drug dealing. For this, Sabaini was convicted of federal corruption charges. Part of Howard’s appeal was objecting to the court refusing his request to subpoena Agent Sabaini, who could have provided a “public authority” defense for his drug dealing. Sabaini had refused to testify voluntarily because he was anticipating his own appeal, and feared discussing recorded jail calls that explained his quid pro quo deal with Howard.

Howard was also unsuccessfully objecting to the warrantless search of his phone, but Judge Steven C. Seeger disagreed because this search fell under the inevitable discovery doctrine: investigators had probable cause from text messages.

Howard should not have needed to continue dealing because he was being paid by HSI for informing. The standard method of payment is up to 25% of the net recovery from an asset forfeiture or net recoveries from a trafficking bust. They can also make up to $100,000 per year in cash payouts, with most paying only a few thousand dollars for a few buys. One of Howard’s problems was that he needed to pay his corrupt handler Agent Sabaini at least $50,000 for protection and law enforcement information. This specific amount was communicated in the coded text: “50 words on a page”, where “50” stood for $50,000. Sabaini used this cash to purchase a new car. In another case, Sabaini requested $50,000 from HSI for a cash drug buy only to pocket this cash while giving his informant counterfeit bills to use in the sale.

The corrupt dealings might have continued if wires were not crossed when Howard tried to sell two ounces for $2,400 from another confidential informant in 2017: this one from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). This suggests that American drug enforcement agencies are spending so much money and labor that they are catch each other in corrupt activities internal auditing methods are failing to catch. Sabaini managed to convince DEA agent Phillip Hahn not to prosecute his “golden goose” in 2017, he failed to intervene before Howard was arrested on a second DEA informant’s sale in 2018. With Howard in the system, it was too late for DEA Special Agent Anthony Anglada to take Sabaini up on his offer for Howard to “work it off if he cooperated”. A new problem then surfaced when Howard refused to “work it off” or to cooperate with Agent Anglada’s investigation. Thus, the DEA had to press charges for this sale against Howard. While Howard refused to cooperate in some ways, he had given a post-arrest statement that confessed to the drug deal because the investigator convinced him with a false promise of leniency. This meant Howard’s coerced statement could be suppressed at the trial, but not the gun, cash, and drug-dealing ledger that were found during a search at his house.

According to the American Civil Liberties Union, 80% of federal drug prosecutions involve confidential informants. And the total might be higher because 95% of drug cases are plea bargained, meaning the government never has to disclose how they obtained the evidence against the person on trial. And the United States Sentencing Commission has found that 50% of federal drug defendants cooperate or snitch on other drug dealers to ease their own sentences. And Forbes found that the DEA has an active list of 18,000 confidential informants. Their study calculated FBI, DEA and AFT jointly paid informants $548 million over a few years. While this seems like a lot, if the other two agencies have similar numbers of informants, each of them would have made on average $2,537 per year. Meanwhile, the National Bureau of Economic Research has concluded an average street dealer makes less than minimum wage at between $6-11 per hour.

To summarize what is happening: half of all people facing drug charges offer to serve as informants, but only a small percentage of these are asked to do so officially, and most might only assist with one or two drug buys. This is because after 2-4 controlled drug buys, they have worked off the quota required by their agreement that dropped their charges or reduced their sentence. And after helping to arrest their immediate network, an informant stops having value because they lack additional contacts that an officer would not be able to find themselves on cold buys.

The trick that Howard and Agent Sabaini pulled off before their arrest was to generate no drug busts or arrests across their affiliation. Howard did not make any controlled sales because the agent on his case wanted to make money from Howard in exchange for not busting him. The reason Howard transitioned from a $2,400 sale in 2017 to a $280,000 sale in 2018 was because he did not rat on his contacts, but rather helped to protect these connects with Sabaini’s help. Howard had become a rare example of a profitable dealer because of Sabaini’s protection.

A drug dealer in America has a 1-in-4 chance of being arrested in a given year, and near 100% certainty of being arrested over their career. This is assured by the 50% informant-turning odds, and is the reason for America having one of the highest incarceration rates in the world. In contrast, in Western Europe, Canada, Japan and most other developed nations, it is unheard of for agencies to give enormous cash payments to criminal informants. Abroad paying cash to informants is classified as bribery, as only basic reimbursement is allowed. And elsewhere prosecutors lack unreviewable discretion to wipe away felony charges because a defendant offers to snitch.

This case thus helps to explain that one way America could rapidly drop its incarceration rate, as well as its higher murder and lethal drug overdose rates is by adopting other countries policies of not paying cash to informants, and not dropping charges in exchange for snitching. Having one of the highest incarceration rates in the world has create a cycle of spiking addiction and criminality rates because those who enter the system cannot find work outside of it. Returning to Howard’s appeal: why did a dealer feel he was in the right despite being busted in this massive sale? From Howard’s perspective, he was paying kickbacks to a government agent who was (seemingly officially) directing him to make sales to have money to pay him kickbacks. If Sabaini was orchestrating these deals, he succeeded in deploying the American secrecy shield to not be forced to incriminate himself by explaining this under oath. Though mostly the appeal was the work of a lawyer who wanted to make a bit more money from a convicted drug dealer by nitpicking about a warrantless search and the definition of an “agreement”.

Suggested Citation:
Faktorovich, Anna. “Drug Dealer Informant and His Corrupt HSI Handler Caught in $280,000 Cocaine Sale by DEA’s Informant.” Anaphora’s Law Review (October 24, 2026).

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