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Ohio Judges Confirm the Burden to Prove Righteousness Is with the Police in Excessive Force Allegations

25 Oct

Do police officers have a special right to assault suspects? This strange question has been under debate in Ohio courts. Historically, the prosecution has harried the absolute burden of proof over every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defendant had to prove affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. But then in 2019, the Ohio General Assembly amended its rules to state that if a defendant raises self-defense, defense of another, or defense of a residence, the burden shifts to the state to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. This legislation failed to mention “reasonable use of force by a police officer”, leaving an opening for the ongoing dispute. Back in 1989, Graham v. Connor had established that a police officer’s violence was legally justified if it met standards of “objective reasonableness”. Then in 2024, State v. Graham argued that the State of Ohio bore the burden of proof to show an officer’s use of force was unreasonable. This decision was flipped in March and reaffirmed more formally in September 2026 in State v. McInnes, where the panel decided the police officer bore the burden of proof use of force was reasonable.

Officer Ian W. McInnes was accused of excessive force in four incidents that took place between 2020-2. He had: 1. kicked one man in the face while he was subdued by a taser, 2. kicked a handcuffed 17-year-old in the groin while handcuffed, 3. kicked a complaint, kneeling mentally ill man in the back, and 4. struck a fleeing suspect with his police cruiser. The jury convicted McInnes on the first three charges on October 18, 2024, but acquitted him on the last. He was sentenced to a 30-months prison sentence in 2025. Then, by citing State v. Graham, McInnes’ lawyer appealed his conviction arguing the burden of proof should have been with the prosecutors. If they had won this appeal, anybody accusing police of excessive force would have to go to extraordinary length to insist police surrender body cameras of an assault, or to gather witness testimony to support their position that they had indeed been beaten up when they were complying with a police officer.

Given the repeat violations McInnes was guilty of, this was a good case to test the irrationality of the opposing position. A victim of police brutality might have a concussion, and is likely to be incarcerated after this interaction, so place the burden of proof they have been violated on them or on their likely public attorney would have unjustly further shifted power towards violence-prone officers.

McInnes claims he had “slipped” when hitting a tasered man, made a tactical miscalculation when kicking a surrendering man, or had made contact with the upper thigh instead of the groin of the third seem to have been rebuttals one issues when they anticipate they will not be reprimanded no matter how ridiculous their excuses are.

The initial case was a public corruption and civil rights indictment that had been filed against 13 East Cleveland police officers, whose trials and appeals were later severed. 7 of the officers either entered guilty pleas or became cooperating witnesses, 3 officers had cases dismissed or acquitted, and three officers (including McInnes) proceeded to full jury trials and were convicted to between 1 and 4 years in prison. While the other two convicted cops also filed appeals, only McInnes’ case was selected for the top-level en banc full-court review. With bodycams as the norm across all major precincts, officers should be informed during retraining that they cannot hit-a-man-when-he-is-down as a legal fact. It is important for jurisdictions to explain elements such as who has to prove misbehavior, and for these decisions to be plainly explained to officers, who might otherwise assume they are the Law.

Suggested Citation:
Faktorovich, Anna. “Ohio Judges Confirm the Burden to Prove Righteousness Is with the Police in Excessive Force Allegations.” Anaphora’s Law Review (October 25, 2026).

Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Conviction So Egregious It Has Not Been Overturned

25 Oct

Back in 2012, Miller v. Alabama outlawed mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders. Then, in 2016, Montgomery v. Louisiana found that this rule had to be retroactively applied to past cases. This invited relitigating of past life-without-parole cases. Over 1,200 applicants of the near 3,000 appeals have successfully reversed life sentences and have been released from prison. The new minimum sentences are capped at between 25-40 years. Only around 4.1% of appears have resulted in a judge reissuing the life-sentence under the “irreparably corrupt” offender standard. This latter category includes Jason Michael Pilcher, who has been denied a reversal and has failed a new appeal on September 23, 2026 in State v. Pilcher at the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

In 1993, Pilcher was 15 when he and a companion runaway stole a car, and burglarized guns before driving this stolen car into a ditch, and breaking into the rural home of Mrs. Phyllis Albritton, who let them in to use her phone, and gave them ice water. While partaking of this hospitality, Pilcher pulled out his stolen .38 caliber revolver and her killed her instantly by shooting her in the head. Pilcher also shot to death her 11-year-old son Jusin and tried to shoot her 13-year-old daughter. In 1994, Pilcher was convicted in an 11-to-1 non-unanimous jury vote to mandatory lime imprisonment without parole for two counts of second-degree murder.

Pilcher failed to convince the court at a 2025 resentencing hearing to lower his sentence because his 30-year prison record proved he remained “irreparably corrupt” and thus a continuing danger to society. Expert testimony from Dr. Simoneaux had explained that the prison record indicated Pilcher had no taken classes (that might have helped by providing proof of his attempts at rehabilitation) in prison since 2016. Back in 2017, Dr. Simoneaux had concluded Pilcher still had a “clinically elevated profile”, meaning he was unusually “resentful, angry, and distrustful” for an adult. Anger and paranoia are a combination for violence.

Pilcher’s appeal had focused on accusing his family of providing a difficult childhood. For example, Pilcher’s mother, Janet Harmon, testified that she drank during the pregnancy, though she could not recall if it had been “whiskey” or “Crown Royal”. Pilcher was diagnosed with ADHD in elementary school and was prescribed Ritalin. Before this, his father had begun disciplining Pilcher by spanking him with his “hand on the butt”. There were several other problems, and during his first trail, neurologist Dr. Pinkus concluded he had a “congenital malformations of the brain and right temporal lobe with learning disorder, poor coordination, and lack of impulse control.”

While this is a sympathetic list of problems Pilcher has had to overcome, the fact that he remains a danger to society is proven by the over a hundred disciplinary conduct infractions Dr. Simoneaux reported Pilcher had been cited for while he has been in prison: he is still displaying signs of a dangerous antisocial personality disorder. If Pilcher had been released despite these continuing violent incidents, he would probably have been back in prison by now on new violent charges. This case seems to prove judges have been able to discern which of the life-without-parole appeals have been filed by those who had not developed psychological resilience or rationality since their juvenile actions. Yes, it is at times unfair to continue to penalize an adult for the actions of their undeveloped youth, but not when they keep committing similar actions now that they are an adult.

***

There was a similar recent appeal in Louisiana in State v. Craig that initially ruled that Dale Dwayne Craig was eligible for parole before the latest September 10, 2026 ruling reversed this decision, reinstating his original parole ineligibility. In 1992, Craig and three accomplices kidnapped out of a Louisiana State University parking lot a freshman Kipp Gullett, torturing and then murdering him. Craig was initially sentenced to death in 1994, then this was commuted to life in 2005, and a sentencing review in 2023 temporarily made him eligible for parole before the latest appeal pointed out that Craig had attempted two previous violent escapes: threatening to kill a guard with a shank during his 1993 trial, and then cutting his window bars and climbing over security fences from death row in 1999. A three-judge panel heard the 2026 appeal, with two of them for the reversal (led by Judge Stromberg) and one dissenting (Judge Fields), found he had a permanent disregard for the law, categorizing him among the state’s “worst offenders” that mandated a permanent containment. Louisiana is one of two states where life without parole is an automatic sentence for adult second-degree murder. Thus, letting either Pilcher or Craig go free after even a prolonged sentence—just because of their age during the crime—would be unfair to adults that do not have a chance to argue about their difficult youth or other mitigating circumstances.

Suggested Citation:
Faktorovich, Anna. “Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Conviction So Egregious It Has Not Been Overturned.” Anaphora’s Law Review (October 25, 2026).

Drug Dealer Informant and His Corrupt HSI Handler Caught in $280,000 Cocaine Sale by DEA’s Informant

24 Oct

On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Northern District of Illinois affirmed the conviction in United States v. Gary L. Howard of Howard to a 13-year prison sentence. Howard was appealing that the drug deal he was caught making was part of the work he previously did as a confidential informant for Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Howard has been convicted on three federal drug charges for selling cocaine in a 2018 sting when he attempted purchasing 10 kilograms of cocaine for $280,000 in the parking lot of informant seller “Z’s” furniture store. A search of his home uncovered a loaded firearm and a drug ledger.

Howard’s HSI handler Anthony Sabaini had been receiving tips from Howard on rival dealers. In exchange for information, Sabaini had been asking other agencies to “stand down” on investigating Howard’s drug dealing. For this, Sabaini was convicted of federal corruption charges. Part of Howard’s appeal was objecting to the court refusing his request to subpoena Agent Sabaini, who could have provided a “public authority” defense for his drug dealing. Sabaini had refused to testify voluntarily because he was anticipating his own appeal, and feared discussing recorded jail calls that explained his quid pro quo deal with Howard.

Howard was also unsuccessfully objecting to the warrantless search of his phone, but Judge Steven C. Seeger disagreed because this search fell under the inevitable discovery doctrine: investigators had probable cause from text messages.

Howard should not have needed to continue dealing because he was being paid by HSI for informing. The standard method of payment is up to 25% of the net recovery from an asset forfeiture or net recoveries from a trafficking bust. They can also make up to $100,000 per year in cash payouts, with most paying only a few thousand dollars for a few buys. One of Howard’s problems was that he needed to pay his corrupt handler Agent Sabaini at least $50,000 for protection and law enforcement information. This specific amount was communicated in the coded text: “50 words on a page”, where “50” stood for $50,000. Sabaini used this cash to purchase a new car. In another case, Sabaini requested $50,000 from HSI for a cash drug buy only to pocket this cash while giving his informant counterfeit bills to use in the sale.

The corrupt dealings might have continued if wires were not crossed when Howard tried to sell two ounces for $2,400 from another confidential informant in 2017: this one from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). This suggests that American drug enforcement agencies are spending so much money and labor that they are catch each other in corrupt activities internal auditing methods are failing to catch. Sabaini managed to convince DEA agent Phillip Hahn not to prosecute his “golden goose” in 2017, he failed to intervene before Howard was arrested on a second DEA informant’s sale in 2018. With Howard in the system, it was too late for DEA Special Agent Anthony Anglada to take Sabaini up on his offer for Howard to “work it off if he cooperated”. A new problem then surfaced when Howard refused to “work it off” or to cooperate with Agent Anglada’s investigation. Thus, the DEA had to press charges for this sale against Howard. While Howard refused to cooperate in some ways, he had given a post-arrest statement that confessed to the drug deal because the investigator convinced him with a false promise of leniency. This meant Howard’s coerced statement could be suppressed at the trial, but not the gun, cash, and drug-dealing ledger that were found during a search at his house.

According to the American Civil Liberties Union, 80% of federal drug prosecutions involve confidential informants. And the total might be higher because 95% of drug cases are plea bargained, meaning the government never has to disclose how they obtained the evidence against the person on trial. And the United States Sentencing Commission has found that 50% of federal drug defendants cooperate or snitch on other drug dealers to ease their own sentences. And Forbes found that the DEA has an active list of 18,000 confidential informants. Their study calculated FBI, DEA and AFT jointly paid informants $548 million over a few years. While this seems like a lot, if the other two agencies have similar numbers of informants, each of them would have made on average $2,537 per year. Meanwhile, the National Bureau of Economic Research has concluded an average street dealer makes less than minimum wage at between $6-11 per hour.

To summarize what is happening: half of all people facing drug charges offer to serve as informants, but only a small percentage of these are asked to do so officially, and most might only assist with one or two drug buys. This is because after 2-4 controlled drug buys, they have worked off the quota required by their agreement that dropped their charges or reduced their sentence. And after helping to arrest their immediate network, an informant stops having value because they lack additional contacts that an officer would not be able to find themselves on cold buys.

The trick that Howard and Agent Sabaini pulled off before their arrest was to generate no drug busts or arrests across their affiliation. Howard did not make any controlled sales because the agent on his case wanted to make money from Howard in exchange for not busting him. The reason Howard transitioned from a $2,400 sale in 2017 to a $280,000 sale in 2018 was because he did not rat on his contacts, but rather helped to protect these connects with Sabaini’s help. Howard had become a rare example of a profitable dealer because of Sabaini’s protection.

A drug dealer in America has a 1-in-4 chance of being arrested in a given year, and near 100% certainty of being arrested over their career. This is assured by the 50% informant-turning odds, and is the reason for America having one of the highest incarceration rates in the world. In contrast, in Western Europe, Canada, Japan and most other developed nations, it is unheard of for agencies to give enormous cash payments to criminal informants. Abroad paying cash to informants is classified as bribery, as only basic reimbursement is allowed. And elsewhere prosecutors lack unreviewable discretion to wipe away felony charges because a defendant offers to snitch.

This case thus helps to explain that one way America could rapidly drop its incarceration rate, as well as its higher murder and lethal drug overdose rates is by adopting other countries policies of not paying cash to informants, and not dropping charges in exchange for snitching. Having one of the highest incarceration rates in the world has create a cycle of spiking addiction and criminality rates because those who enter the system cannot find work outside of it. Returning to Howard’s appeal: why did a dealer feel he was in the right despite being busted in this massive sale? From Howard’s perspective, he was paying kickbacks to a government agent who was (seemingly officially) directing him to make sales to have money to pay him kickbacks. If Sabaini was orchestrating these deals, he succeeded in deploying the American secrecy shield to not be forced to incriminate himself by explaining this under oath. Though mostly the appeal was the work of a lawyer who wanted to make a bit more money from a convicted drug dealer by nitpicking about a warrantless search and the definition of an “agreement”.

Suggested Citation:
Faktorovich, Anna. “Drug Dealer Informant and His Corrupt HSI Handler Caught in $280,000 Cocaine Sale by DEA’s Informant.” Anaphora’s Law Review (October 24, 2026).

3M SLAPP Sues 3 Lawyers for Aggressively Pressing Claims of Hundreds of Black Lung Suffering Clients

24 Oct

On September 30, 2026, in 3M Company v. Glenn M. Hammond et al, Judge Robert E. Wier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky allowed 3M’s federal civil RICO claim to proceed to discovery while dismissing Kentucky state fraud and conspiracy claims. The defendants being sued by 3M are three lawyers—Glenn Hammond (of Kentucky), Michael Martin (of Texas), and Johnny Givens (of Mississippi)—who had filed 22 mass-tort product liability lawsuits in Kentucky against 3M on behalf of over 850 coal miners, who allege 3M’s dust mask respirators were defective, and thus caused them to contract black lung. 3M alleges that to obtain a massive settlement these lawyers cold-called “fraudulent claimants”, who they allege never wore 3M masks, never mined or had not been diagnosed with black lung.

On a first review, this seems to be a retaliatory suit filed by 3M to avoid paying the suing miners. This allegation was first raised suspiciously, on January 17, 2023, when one of these defendants, Martin, texted 3M’s counsel with the message that he “lamented that Defendant Hammond was ‘hurting our clients with real claims because so many are frivolous’”. It is incredible that Martin just happened to confess this to opposing counsel; he seems to have been intimidated or otherwise manipulated into writing this. The defendants seem to have been diligently weeding out unsubstantiated claims, as they had dismissed 16 claims beforehand between 2021-2, and then dismissed 43 other claims on January 27, 2023. But then 3M objected to these dismissals, so the defendants agreed to keep these claims.

While these additions and subtractions of claimants seem routine, the conclusion 3M’s counsel reaches is that this means the defendants “intended to deprive 3M of money through fraud, deceit, and artifice”.

The lawyers’ defense is logical: their standard legal actions of filing lawsuits and managing discovery cannot serve as “predicate acts” (i.e., mail and wire fraud) under federal racketeering (RICO) laws. A lawyer cannot worry of committing a federal crime every time they aggressively pursue a lawsuit. The judge countered this by arguing 3M’s accusations stretched beyond regular lawyerly conduct, as it was accusing them also of engaging in deception, fabrication of evidence and multi-state fraud. The Kentucky state fraud case was dismissed, while federal RICO conspiracy claims will proceed.

Judging who is in the right in this case is more difficult than the surface suggests. The tort lawsuits have been stalled since 3M filed this countersuit against the lawyers. The initial court filings accuse Hammond of having “forged intake records to conceal” misconduct. But then, when offering specifics on another case, it merely accuses Hammond of ignoring a client: a simple neglect for which he was oddly sanctioned by the Kentucky Supreme Court. And Martin was sued by one of the 3M clients who he dropped for $150,000 in damages. Givens also had a misconduct allegation made against him for merely misstating that one of his claimants had worked for a “parish” he had no in fact worked for. There is no rational evidence provided here that would prove anything but the mistakes likely to seep in when lawyers attempt to file cases on behalf of hundreds of clients. 3M is fighting against certain bankruptcy because only two miners previously secured a $67.5 million verdict. Paying all litigants such sums would bankrupt the world’s biggest companies.

The rational approach seems to be for 3M to argue that its labeling never promised black lung protection levels. They have argued this, as has federal safety regulations that state masks are insufficient for dust compliance safety. They should be accompanied with a ventilation system, water sprays, dust traps or other preventative measures. The reason the 2 miners won in 2018 was because they argued there were mask defects (that caused leaks in hot and sweaty mining conditions) that 3M knew about since the 1970s.

Is it logical to bankrupt a major mask manufacturer to help miners? 3M’s scientists have introduced very expensive redesigns that have solved the hot-sweating-leaks, but most mining companies tend to purchase the basic 3M models that have not changed since the 70s. While recommending not suint 3M so they can invest more into lowering the price of their innovatively protective products seems like a good idea, 3M has proven that they prefer to stick with what has been profitable. According to the Centers of Disease Control, around 1,000 miners die of black lung annually, and this number has been rising. And according to PBS, around 1 in 3 veteran underground miners in Kentucky, Virginia and West Virginia today test positive for black lung. 3M and Mine Safety Appliances have had a duopoly over mining respirators since 1970, when miners began wearing masks, while continuing to die of black lung. The rate of death seems to have been the same before and after 3M masks began to be used. While a mask might block 95% of particles, it is the remaining tiny particles that cause the mega damage. Perhaps if these lawsuits take 3M out of business, this industry will figure out how to create products that would not contribute to killing so many people that three cold-calling lawyers will find thousands of miners with claim-worthy accounts.

Suggested Citation:
Faktorovich, Anna. “3M SLAPP Sues 3 Lawyers for Aggressively Pressing Claims of Hundreds of Black Lung Suffering Clients.” Anaphora’s Law Review (October 24, 2026).

Russian Fertilizer Oligarch Battles Against Kickback-Taking Antigua Prime Minister Over His Superyacht

23 Oct

A tragedy has been unraveling for fertilizer Russian oligarch Andrey Guryev, who invested time and effort into purchasing the Alfa Nero 257-foot superyacht in 2014 by via offshore shell companies to pretend he did not “own” it, but merely “charted” it. The problem: Antigua’s corrupt officials heard of Guryev’s insistence of non-ownership and decided to declare it as abandoned to pocket the proceeds.

Antigua won early litigation in U.S. federal and New York courts, with the latter even ordering Guryev’s daughter Yulia Guryeva-Motlokhov to destroy all U.S. banking records they had clawed out through discovery. But now a Florida court is questioning why the Antigua records have been allowed to not be turned over having been categorized as “lost”.

On September 7, 2026, U.S. Magistrate Judge Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein of the Southern District of Florida allowed applicant Yulia Guryeva-Motlokhov and her attorneys at Boies Schiller Flexner LLP to issue subpoenas to uncover the missing money trails and corporate records linked to an alleged international public corruption ring orchestrated by Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister Gaston Browne. Guryeva claims that “Browne was strategically involved in the” illegal seizure and “subsequent sale of the Alfa Nero”—a $120 million superyacht with its onboard art.

Prime Minister Gaston Browne’s “administration was set to receive up to a 50% commission”—i.e., kickback—on this sale. The refusal to submit the paperwork from this transaction is also being litigated as contributing to “hiding criminal proceeds under” UAE law.

After the commencement of the Ukraine-Russian war, this yacht that had been docked in Antigua was stopped by Antiguan officials from leaving their harbor. They then passed legislation “to declare” Alfa Nero as “abandoned” to be able to sell it at an auction. It was thus sold for $40 million to the Yildirim Group, a Turkish construction and shipping company. This seems to have been a manipulated auction since this was lower than the highest bid of $67 million. In other words, the auction organizers favored a lower bid than the most profitable option for the state because they had an under-the-table deal with the lower bidder that kicked a bribe over to them.

The new Florida discovery request focuses on Gastone Browne III, the Prime Minister’s son and business proxy because he is especially reachable due to ties to south Florida. And Browne III is “likely to possess critical information about the 2024 sale of the Alfa Nero and associated kickback; his father’s business partners, ventures, and real estate holdings (including his extensive properties allegedly located in this District); and the disposition of the sale proceeds and kickback.” Northrop, the yacht broker who submitted the low winning bid, are also being asked to disclose their records.

One of the questions the discovery hopes to resolve is what happened to the $4 million left out of the total $40 million sale, from which only $36 million have been accounted for by Northrop in previous disclosures.

The bigger criminal problem is that in addition to this reported $40 million price, $6 million has been alleged to have been paid as a hidden bribe credited as a “consulting” fee to Prime Minister Browne, paid via his personal attorney. This payment was recorded in Northrop’s corporate accounts.

The U.S. Federal Court approved these new subpoenas to provide this evidence to four separate international proceedings. In Antigua and Barbuda, there is a pending constitutional challenge to the legislative act that was used to initially seize and auction the vessel as abandoned, when it merely could not be moved due to sanctions against its owner. In Russia, a civil lawsuit is seeking financial damages for the illegal expropriation of the yacht and its art. In the United Arab Emirates, a federal criminal complaint is under review over the hiding or transacting of illicit criminal proceeds. And a retaliatory defamation lawsuit was launched by Prime Minister Browne against the Boies Schiller Flexner legal team. Thus, the court has ruled Boies’ lawyers have a right to use federal discovery to prove the “defense of truth” against the Prime Minister’s claims.

The cost of pursuing these cases is likely to have cost millions in federal, state, constitutional, civil and global attorney’s fees on all sides. And this is only one of around twenty similar Russian oligarch yachts that are in litigation over these assets being frozen or forfeited.

While Anglo-American courts have been refusing to accept “straw owner” claims over these yachts, there was a single victory—that proved billionaire Alisher Asmanov had no legal control—in Germany over the priciest $600 million Dilbar superyacht.

There have been at least one other corruption accusations against forfeiture proceedings: US has argued the liquidation sale of the Amadea would see its $187 million in proceeds going to Ukraine, but instead it has been spent internally within the U.S. Marshals Service.

Russia’s spending 43% of its government budget on its military has contributed to around half-a-million Russian and over a hundred thousand Ukrainian war fatalities. Meanwhile, Russia’s civilian economy is starved, its bond market has continued to crash and debts have been ballooning. And the recent strikes on Russian oil refineries have prevented Russia from profiting from record-high oil prices.

What good have the yacht confiscations done? They did convince a single oligarch, Oleg Tinkov, to post a tirade on Instagram in 2022 that insisted that 90% of Russians oppose the Ukraine war, categorizing this invasion as “insane” and “crazy”. In retaliation, the Russian government then pressured to sell his stake in his Tinkoff Bank for a fraction of its value. And shortly thereafter he renounced his Russian citizenship. UK then removed Tinkov form its sanctions blacklist, freeing Tinkov to take possession of his yacht, which had been docked in Mexico, whose authorities refused to participate in Western seizure efforts.

In contrast, poor Guryev has remained silent about the war to retain a 48.4% stake in his fertilizer business, but has had to live in Moscow because he cannot legally enter not only his superyacht, but also his $400 million London mansion.

Suggested Citation:
Faktorovich, Anna. “Russian Fertilizer Oligarch Battles Against Kickback-Taking Antigua Prime Minister Over His Superyacht.” Anaphora’s Law Review (October 23, 2026).